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Abstract
The article discusses linguistic approaches to power and deals with question-answer types 
of interaction in institutional discourse. The main focus is on discursive tools available 
to participants with an institutional status and the way these powerful participants restrict 
their interlocutors through questioning. The article starts with introducing general 
principles applicable to all institutional discourse types; it then proceeds to demonstrating 
these principles on a detailed analysis of several extracts from courtroom discourse.
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1 Approaches to power
The phenomenon of power poses many challenges to researchers aiming 
at delimiting, let alone measuring it. The understanding of power has been 
developing for decades and originates in Foucault’s theory of power (1977, 1980, 
as quoted in Thornborrow 2002: 7). Foulcaut stresses that power is activated 
through interaction. Critical linguists, who were inspired by Foulcaut, consider 
power to be pre-determined rather than negotiable or shifting. According to 
critical linguists, power is attributed to the participants of talk according to their 
institutional identity, social status or gender (ibid.).
The main ideas of critical linguists were taken up by Fairclough (1989) 
and developed into a more complex theory of “power in discourse, and power 
behind discourse” (ibid.: 43). For Fairclough, “power is won, held and lost in 
social struggle” (ibid.: 74) and as such it is manifested in different types of 
social and factual constraints (ibid.: 74-76). As Thornborrow (2002: 16) puts 
it, such an approach makes it necessary to consider social relations (e.g. control 
over the interactional space, turn-taking, topic management, formulation of 
facts, modality, politeness features) as well as social reality (e.g. lexical choice, 
metaphorical meanings) when analysing power in texts.
CA (conversation analysis) scholars have also been dealing with the 
question of power, though in a very tentative way, preferring to use the term 
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asymmetry. Following the CA methodology, Drew and Heritage (1992: 47-51) 
mention three reasons which give rise to asymmetries in institutional discourse: a 
question-answer pattern of interaction, different amount of knowledge shared by 
the participants, and the perception of a client’s unique case as a routine situation. 
The authors consider the question-answer pattern of interaction to be the most 
important reason of asymmetries. Asymmetry is thus viewed mainly in terms of 
interactional space and turn-taking management (Thornborrow 2002: 21). In his 
article, Hutchby (1996: 484) justifi es the CA’s focus on the local management of 
talk-in-interaction as a basis for the analysis of power relations in institutional 
settings. On examples extracted from British talk radio shows, the author 
demonstrates that the exercise of power and resistance to it become observable 
only after a thorough analysis of the sequential organisation of interaction.
The methodology followed in this article is after Thornborrow (2002), whose 
approach to power relations in institutional discourse lies in between CA and 
CDA (critical discourse analysis). In her book Power Talk, the author follows the 
sequential development of the interaction and at the same time considers how 
individual turns fi t into a wider social and institutional context. Thornborrow thus 
discusses institutional discourse from the perspective of power balance paying 
special attention to discursive tools that an institutional status allows powerful 
interlocutors to use.
2 Institutional discourse
Institutional discourse offers a rich source for analysing power since there 
are big differences between the participants in their institutional roles or social 
statuses. One of the most typical features of institutional discourse is restrictions 
on types of contributions that participants are allowed to make (Drew & Heritage 
1992: 22-25, Levinson 1992: 97). Thornborrow (2002: 4) specifi es two types of 
such restrictions: the asymmetrical distribution of speaker rights and obligations 
(e.g. barristers have the right to ask questions, witnesses are obliged to provide 
answers) and the differential access to discursive resources and identities (e.g. 
barristers are more likely to ask questions than witnesses). These characteristics 
are shared by a wide variety of institutional interactions ranging from classroom 
discussion talks to police interrogations (ibid.: 135).
Drew and Heritage (1992: 25-29) point out that institutional interactions 
set in formal settings share more common features within their category than 
with institutional interactions set in non-formal settings. Witness examination in 
court and news interviews are, for instance, among the most formal institutional 
interaction types and display such features as strictly restrained turn-taking 
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(i.e. turn-taking rules that do not allow any deviations from the formally 
prescribed procedures) and the phenomenon of an overhearing audience (i.e. the 
talk between the direct participants is aimed at the third party that does not have 
an opportunity to participate, cf. Drew & Heritage 1992: 25-27).
As far as turn-taking is concerned, Sacks et al. (1974: 701) make an assumption 
that in institutional dialogues turn order and turn size are pre-specifi ed instead 
of being locally managed as is the case for everyday conversation. Atkinson and 
Drew’s (1979) analysis of courtroom examination shows that apart from turn 
order and turn size it is also the type of turn and distribution of turn that are 
fi xed. This also applies to media interviews (Hutchby 1996). More powerful 
institutional members thus have control over all aspects of turn-taking (i.e. turn 
order, turn size, type of turn, distribution of turn).
As far as the phenomenon of an overhearing audience is concerned, it is 
important to realise that in courtroom discourse, for instance, the mere act of 
asking a question and answering it implies a more complex system, in which 
more participants are engaged. During witness examination the witness is the 
addressee of a counsel’s question, but other participants are indirect targets as 
they follow the examination and, what is more, perceive covert messages implied 
in questions. Similarly, the real addressee of witness replies is not the counsel 
(since counsels usually know the answers to their own questions) but the judge 
and jury (Heffer 2005: 49). The counsel-witness interaction can therefore be 
characterised as a display talk (Cotterill 2003: 122, after Goffman 1981). The 
same applies to media interviews as they are conducted with respect to the public 
who is following the interview on the radio or TV or open class examination 
when students are called to answer the teacher’s questions and other students are 
expected to follow the teacher-student exchange.
3 The exercise of power through questions
The research on power in institutional discourse pays special attention to 
the role of questioning and inequalities created by the fact that institutional 
participants are expected to ask questions as well as insist on replies (e.g. Wang 
2006, Tracy & Robles 2009). The power of questioning has been researched in 
many different types of institutional discourse (e.g. medical discourse – Frankel 
1990; police discourse – Haworth 2006, Newbury & Johnson 2006; media 
discourse – Hutchby 1996, Thornborrow 2001; courtroom discourse – Matoesian 
2005, Chang 2004, Bülow-Møller 1992).
Hutchby (1996: 484) points out that questions are a powerful interactional 
resource due to the fact that they limit the recipients in their discourse options 
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and force them into providing answers. Wang (2006) explains that “the inborn 
features of questions make them naturally bound up with power in that questions 
possess the ability to dominate and control” (ibid.: 531). By the mere act of 
asking a question, the questioner chooses the speaker, takes a turn, and defi nes 
the type of the following turn (i.e. questions are typically followed by responses, 
cf. Sacks et al. 1974). What is more important, though, is that the questioner can 
defi ne the topic, type and length of a response (Wang 2006: 533). Hutchby (1996: 
485) stresses that individual questions restrict individual answers, but sequences 
of questions are even more restrictive since a series of questions can limit the 
topic more effectively and infl uence the audience through various connections 
implied in questions.
Institutional fi gures such as doctors, interviewers, counsels, policemen are 
thus in control of not only questions, but also responses and implied messages 
their audiences perceive.
4 The role of questioning during cross-examination
Witness examination is an essential principle of the adversarial legal system. 
By examining witnesses, the prosecution and the defence present their versions 
of events to the judge and jury. While it is expected that witnesses are being 
prepared for the examination-in-chief part, cross-examination proceeds in a 
very hostile atmosphere as witnesses do not know what to expect from opposing 
counsels. The main aim of a cross-examiner is to discredit the testimonies of 
witnesses by casting doubt on their credibility or their presentation of events 
(Gibbons 2003: 112). This is achieved by controlling witnesses with coercive 
questioning.
According to Hobbs (2002: 416), counsels view cross-examination as an 
opportunity to communicate their interpretation of evidence to jurors. The obvious 
way to shape the juror’s opinions is through the replies of witnesses. Experienced 
cross-examiners, nonetheless, know that even the mere act of asking a question 
is a powerful tool on its own. The moment the jurors hear the question with 
an additional implied message, it opens their eyes to alternative interpretations 
implied in the message. The actual response from a witness (even if the witness 
is denying the embedded message) may lose its signifi cance. Hobbs (2002: 
413-414), a former practising lawyer, stresses that counsels expect the audience 
to draw inferences on the basis of implicit connections proposed through their 
questions.
Quantitative research on cross-examination questioning in court (Woodbury 
1984, Danet et al. 1980, Luchjenbroers 1997) has shown that the most frequent 
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types of questions counsels use are closed questions (i.e. yes/no questions, 
alternative questions, declarative questions and tag questions). This is not 
surprising since coercive closed questions control witness responses, and thus 
reduce witnesses to the role of minimal responders. Closed questions give 
counsels an opportunity to give evidence on behalf of witnesses (Hobbs 2003: 
486-487).
While the syntactic form of questions helps to defi ne the response boundaries 
and elicit type-confi rming replies, pragmatic strategies are of equal importance. 
It is a strong understanding of the interaction between meaning, context, and 
communication that helps counsels to corner witnesses effectively. The research 
on pragmatic cross-examination strategies has shown that counsels make use 
of various aspects of language and communication. Cross-examination tactics 
thus range from lexical means (a careful choice of words used in questions, see 
Cotterill 2004) to prosodic means or even turn-taking management (ironic tone 
or prolonged pauses after signifi cant replies can be used strategically to convey 
additional meanings, see Gibbons 2003: 117-126).
5 Discursive tools available to cross-examiners
Figure 1 below illustrates discursive tools that enable cross-examiners to 
control all aspects of cross-examination including witness replies and the jury’s 
perception of the information presented.
There is a variety of discursive tools available to cross-examiners. The 
primary one is the right to ask questions, which gives them an opportunity to 
control replies and limit witnesses to merely a powerless position of having to 
provide answers (Heydon 2005: 115). The obvious option cross-examiners can 
use in order to limit the length of witness replies is to ask closed questions. 
In addition, cross-examiners’ institutional right to require type-conforming 
responses basically forces witnesses into yes/no minimal responses (Raymond 
2003: 957). If, for instance, a witness does not want to answer a yes/no question 
with a minimal response, the counsel or the judge can request him/her to do so or 
treat the witness as non-responsive.
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cross-examiners’ right to ask questions
control replies (by asking closed 
questions, requiring 
type-conforming responses)
control turn-taking 
(e.g. by controlling the pace 
and pauses)
control the formulation of facts 
(by asking leading questions with 
embedded messages)
control the interpretation of 
facts (e.g. by making ironic 
comments in third turns)
control topics and their sequence
Figure 1: Discursive tools cross-examiners use to control witness testimonies
Witnesses are also left without the right to suggest new connections since 
cross-examiners have the privilege to control the topics discussed and even their 
sequence (Wang 2006: 541). Leading questions (i.e. questions asked in a manner 
that suggests the answer pursued by the questioner) is yet another powerful tool 
as they give cross-examiners control over the formulation of facts. In addition, 
control over the turn-taking enables cross-examiners to violate the normal 
length of pauses between the turns and to make use of deliberate overlapping 
or prolonged pauses in order to stress facts or dramatise events (Gibbons 2003: 
117). Cross-examiners even have a possibility to control the way the jury 
should interpret responses by a skilful use of third turns. They can, for instance, 
support or challenge answers by evaluating them in third turns (Gibbons 2003: 
124-125).
Examples in the next section show how a highly qualifi ed and experienced 
libel lawyer Richard Rampton QC uses the above-mentioned discursive tools in 
order to restrict witnesses. The witnesses he cross-examines fi nd it diffi cult to 
resist pressure put on them and gain a more powerful position in order to tell the 
court their side of the story.
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6 Examples
The data are drawn from the court transcripts of the non-jury libel case 
McDonald’s Corporation v. Helen Steel and David Morris. Steel and Morris (the 
defendants) were accused in a writ by McDonald’s UK and US (the plaintiffs) 
of publishing and distributing a leafl et called ‘What’s wrong with McDonald’s? 
Everything they do not want you to know’, which contained criticism of 
McDonald’s poor business practices. McDonald’s hired a legal team led by a 
highly qualifi ed and experienced libel lawyer Richard Rampton QC (for more 
information, see Tkačuková 2010). Below are two examples extracted from 
cross-examination conducted by Mr. Rampton, QC.
In the fi rst extract, Example 1, Rampton cross-examines an expert witness on 
nutrition. The counsel tries to challenge the scientifi c expertise of the witness in 
order to reduce his professional status as well as his role as an expert witness in 
the trial.
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Can I ask a little bit more, please, about your professional role in relation to, is it called 
the World Cancer Research Fund?
Yes.
I take it you are not a scientist by training?
As I said this morning, no, I am not.
(…)
You have a degree in physiology?
Yes.
Your role is, therefore – I am not trying to demean it – your role is that of an educated or 
intelligent or both layman, is that right?
No, I would say that going back to the point that my Lord made this morning, I would 
say my expertise here is one of experience rather than formal qualifi cation, yes. I have, 
nevertheless, spent the last 10 years chiefl y concerned with the translation of science into 
public policy. I am not quite sure what profession that puts me in.
(…)
So what do you do?
Meta analysis is a technical term which is rather different from what these reports have 
done which I myself have analysed. In the ordinary meaning of the word, yes, meta analysis 
would I guess do for that. In the scientifi c world meta analysis is more concerned by means 
of very sophisticated mathematical techniques, assessments of the relative probability 
judged between large numbers of epidemiological studies taken together, which is an 
altogether a different exercise from the one I have been engaged in and, indeed, from 
the one that the committees of scientists who produced these reports are engaged in.
The committees of scientists to which you pay attention in making what you call 
translations, what I might call summaries of the cumulative effect; is that fair?
Yes.
Is that rather a rapportaire, that kind of function?
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Yes, I think that is a fair way of putting it. I think I have already drawn the analogy of a 
parallel between the work they do and the work that is done in a place like this. I think it is 
a good analogy. It is often said that the COMA committee which is the offi cial committee 
in this country in this context has a judicial function. So what they are concerned to do 
is to look at the evidence and in the case of more complex reports, actually themselves 
review the evidence which is going back to scientifi c bedrock, as I said, and then on that 
take a view.
So when you do your work, if I have understood it correctly, you will correct me if I am 
wrong, what you look at is what the various committees say about the scientifi c literature 
which they have reviewed?
That is exactly right, yes.
You yourself do not review the scientifi c literature itself?
The cancer division of the World Cancer Research Fund does do that, but we do not do 
it ourselves. (…)
Example 1: Cross-examination of Cannon conducted by Rampton on October 3, 
1994
Rampton starts his cross-examination with introductory questions (lines 
1-2, 4, 7, 9-10, 16) on the position of the witness and his job description. The 
counsel then proceeds to gradually nail down the witness’s answers with a 
series of closed questions (lines 24-25, 27, 34-36, 38) in order to emphasise 
that the witness is a layman rather than a professional with a proper scientifi c 
background. The strategy of nailing down is described by Matoesian (2005: 755) 
as a method when a cross-examiner asks a series of questions about the same 
things gradually underpinning individual details. This strategy allows Rampton 
to reformulate his questions several times and demonstrate the witness’s limited 
position in different ways. The counsel pushes the witness into agreeing with the 
proposition that his expertise comes vicariously through the reviews of scientifi c 
works; the witness is thus not involved in the research and not even reviewing the 
research works himself. Apart from nailing down witness replies with numerous 
closed questions, the counsel also asks negative questions with “hostile question 
content” (Heritage 2002: 1428) in lines 4 and 38; these questions show Rampton’s 
disapproval towards the role of Cannon as an expert witness in the trial.
Another important feature of Rampton’s cross-examination questions is 
the presence of ‘so’ summarisers (lines 16 and 34). Cotterill (2003: 150-151) 
notes that ‘so’ summarisers are abundant in cross-examination. Their role is to 
summarise and evaluate previous responses. Johnson (2002: 108) also states 
that so-prefaced questions during police interviews of adults are formed to 
“recapitulate, summarise and evaluate the interviewee’s previous responses in a 
way that expects and assumes agreement” (ibid.: 108). In line 16, Rampton uses 
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the ‘so’ summariser to stimulate and direct the witness into answering a specifi c 
wh-question. However in line 34, his question already evaluates and summarises 
the replies previously mentioned. Here, the ‘so’ summariser intensifi es the nailing 
down strategy.
The counsel’s implied message (i.e. the message that the witness is just a 
lay person) is further supported by his semantic choices. Cotterill (2004: 530) 
introduces the term ‘lexical landscaping’ to refer to the cross-examination 
strategy when counsels intentionally incorporate into their questions words 
that semantically fi t into their interpretation of events. The tactic of lexical 
landscaping helps Rampton create a picture of how little training is needed 
for the tasks performed by Cannon (an educated or intelligent or both layman 
in lines 9-10; summaries of the cumulative effect in line 25; a rapportaire in 
line 27; You yourself do not review the scientifi c literature itself in line 38). These 
lexical phrases imply that the only task the witness performs is summarise the 
literature.
Rampton also makes use of another common strategy, a false friends strategy 
(Aldridge & Luchjenbroers 2007: 102), when developing his arguments through 
his questions under the pretence of being helpful and polite (I am not trying to 
demean it in line 9; if I have understood it correctly, you will correct me if I am 
wrong in lines 34-35).
In general, Rampton follows clearly specifi ed strategies and makes the witness 
agree with his propositions and implied messages. He does not leave much space 
for the witness to digress or disagree with him. Even ‘so’ summarisers or lexical 
means he uses serve a special purpose and support his coercive questions.
Another extract from Rampton’s cross-examination, Example 2, illustrates 
how skilful the counsel is in providing connections and justifying them even 
when these connections could be perceived as misleading. In the trial, one of 
Rampton’s aims was to show that research linking diet to health problems has 
been inconsistent and that there may be other more serious causes of heart 
diseases or cancer (causes other than a frequent consumption of fast food). As 
he explains to the judge: “Along with my experts it is necessary to demonstrate 
the inconclusive and indeed contradictory nature of the fi ndings in relation to 
diet and cancer” (July 22, 1994). When cross-examining expert witnesses on 
nutrition, Rampton constantly stresses a low degree of certainty in studies linking 
nutrition to cancer and other diseases. Example 2 shows how Rampton evokes 
the story of Galileo and his struggle for the truth. The counsel uses Galileo’s life 
story in order to suggest that even widely accepted facts may be erroneous and 
that people can never be unerring.
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It was widely held at one time, we can agree perhaps, that the world was fl at, was it not?
Yes.
Certain people were persecuted for holding that maybe that view was wrong?
Yes.
It turned out that the people who were persecuted were right, did it not?
You mean Galileo, for example, was right?
Yes.
Indeed so.
The world is not fl at, is it?
It is generally agreed that the world is round, indeed so, yes.
(…)
Virtually every respectable medical man would now accept, perhaps you would agree, that 
there is a causal relationship – I stress the word ‘causal’ – between a diet high in fat and, 
particularly, saturated fat and the incidence of cardiovascular disease, would they not?
Yes.
(…)
What do you make of this book [book called State of the Art]?
Well, that is the state of the art, not only as far as nutritional science is concerned in this 
country, but again to talk about the status of the report. The important thing about COMA 
Reports, when they are accepted by government, as that is, is that that is not merely a 
scientifi c document. It takes the whole process a stage further. That is a document not only 
published by the government but endorsed by government. It is the scientifi c foundation of 
the Health of the Nation initiative.
Let us leave the Minister of Health or the Secretary of State for Health, whatever it is, on 
one side. This document is written and has the stamp, therefore, of approval of a large 
number of medical and nutritional experts, does it not?
Indeed so, yes.
(…)
(Handed). State of the Art. Chapter 3 is about fat, page 39. On 49 we get the particular 
panel’s views about the relationship between the consumption of fat and cancer, yes?
(…)
“The panel concluded that there is currently insuffi cient evidence on which to base a 
recommendation for decrease in fat intake to prevent cancer, although an increase in 
consumption of any fatty acids should not be encouraged. The panel agreed that the DRVs 
based on other considerations and presented in paragraph 3.8 were consistent with a 
prudent view of the current data relating dietary fat and the occurrence of cancer”.
(…)
But that is the fact? It is the conclusion of the panel of experts?
As endorsed by the government, yes.
Example 2: Cross-examination of Cannon conducted by Rampton on October 3, 
1994
The counsel uses natural narrative structure (Gibbons 2003: 123) in order to 
bring to light the topic of widely known misconceptions. By asking short closed 
questions (lines 1, 3, 5, 9), Rampton narrows down a complicated narrative to short 
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phrases, which are easy to comprehend and remember. The prosecuting counsel 
thus sets the ground for the infallability trap (Gibbons 2003: 116), a strategy 
that aims to depict the witness as an expert who overestimates his professional 
skills and knowledge. In the context of Galileo’s story, the witness appears as 
someone who is fi rmly convinced of his opinion and does not realise that there 
may be other causes (apart from diet) of serious illnesses. After developing a 
strong narrative, the counsel asks a question on the existence of causal links 
between McDonald’s type of foods and cardiovascular diseases (lines 12-14); the 
question elicits a positive reply. What is important, though, is that the question 
in lines 12-14 is put in contrast with the Galilean story. The message Rampton 
projects in his question is that the witness may be holding yet another erroneous 
opinion when overestimating the link between a diet high in saturated fat and 
heart problems.
The counsel then moves on to arguing that modern science cannot prove 
that a diet has a signifi cant infl uence on the development of cancer and presents 
an offi cial report called State of the Art (line 17). He asks the witness to read 
out a quotation that supports his view (lines 32-36). In the quotation, it is 
explicitly stated that “there is currently insuffi cient evidence on which to base 
a recommendation for decrease in fat intake to prevent cancer” (lines 32-33). 
Rampton supports the source by referring to it as a document that is “written and 
has the stamp, therefore, of approval of a large number of medical and nutritional 
experts” (lines 25-26) as well as being “the conclusion of the panel of experts” 
(line 38). The tactic of lexical landscaping thus helps the counsel to establish the 
veracity of the document.
In this cross-examination sample, similarly to Example 1, the witness is 
not given a chance to digress. It is the counsel who proposes topics, formulates 
connections and controls the interpretation of the witness’s replies.
7 Conclusions
The article demonstrates a variety of ways cross-examining counsels limit 
witnesses in their responses. Courtroom setting is very specifi c due to highly 
formal court procedures, the phenomenon of the overhearing audience as well 
as the right of counsels and judges to make witnesses answer questions they 
may resent. Counsels have control over all aspects of questioning including 
turn-taking, witness responses, interpretation of answers by the jury or judge. 
Coercive closed questions are the primary means used by counsels. But they also 
use pragmatic tools that require training and experience; pragmatic strategies 
range from lexical means to pragmatic means.
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It is clear that discursive tools available to counsels during cross-examination 
create an unequal distribution of power in their favour. Unfortunately, there 
is little witnesses can do as they have to answer the questions with the form, 
content and implications they cannot infl uence. Even if they try to resist control, 
they may “win the battle but lose the war” (Matoesian 2008) since counsels can 
use the resources available to them to re-contextualise witness testimonies in a 
variety of ways either during witness examination or even after it (during closing 
speeches).
Discursive tools and tactics exemplifi ed in the article apply to other institutional 
discourse types as well, in particular media interviews and police interrogation. 
But questions play a similar role in job interviews or even in classroom. It is thus 
important to be aware of the restrictive power of questions when analysing or 
co-constructing institutional discourse.
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